网络中心联合潜艇与远程导弹突袭航母战法*

运用潜艇和远程导弹联合作战形成的信息与火力联合打击优势来开发突袭航母战斗群的战法是联合作战研究中尚未解决的关键问题之一,根据信息作战、网络中心战和海上游击战原理,分别利用潜艇获取目标位置信息优势和远程导弹对目标打击火力优势,通过海上游击战战法,运用在以卫星为平台的网络中心环境中形成的信息与火力联合打击能力,实施对航母战斗群的突袭,对一个典型实例的初步试验及分析结果表明:与潜艇侦察目标能力有关的正确发现目标概率和评估远程导弹打击目标效果概率以及与远程导弹打击能力有关的命中目标概率对信息与火力联合打击能力的影响分别为20.79%、22.57%和20.20%%,是成功突袭航母战斗群的最重要的因素,而网络中心联合潜艇与远程导弹突袭航母则是充分发挥潜艇和远程导弹综合优势的科学战法。     

The Russian hybrid warfare strategy – neither Russian nor strategy

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its initial actions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the term hybrid warfare has received much public attention. Many have argued that the Russian actions we saw in Ukraine were part of a completely new strategy while others have suggested that there was nothing new in Russia’s actions. This article takes a critical look at these claims. Through the assessment of the history of the term hybrid warfare and a rigorous analysis of the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, this study finds that the Russian hybrid warfare strategy is rather a western myth than a formal comprehensive Russian strategic concept. Additionally, through the assessment of the Russian use of information operations and the way she has utilised the cyberspace in several recent conflicts, the study finds that against all claims Russia did not make these areas its main battlefield, but rather has been using them in support of its traditional concepts.     

海警部队舰艇官兵心理压力及调适

海警舰艇官兵工作环境艰苦,遂行任务艰巨,官兵心理压力过重,给官兵身心健康和部队战斗力带来了一系列负面影响。有效调适海警舰艇官兵心理压力,需要通过组织干预和官兵自我调适等途径来解决。     

基于分布式网络化指控体系的协同跟踪设计

针对当前干扰防空环境下的作战特点，通过对网络化作战需求的分析，建立了一种分布式的网络化指挥控制体系架构，并结合协同跟踪的具体作战运用，设计了基于此分布式体系的协同跟踪作战流程，并建立了效能验证模型。对比一般的集中式指挥控制体系，基于分布式的体系具有生存性强、作战使用效能高的特点。     

Vicarious warfare: The counterproductive consequences of modern American military practice

This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.     

Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures: A Critique of the Literature

This article examines critically the literature of hybrid war and evaluates the countermeasures often proposed. It explains the concept of hybrid warfare and its varied interpretations, illustrating how it is a manifestation of current anxieties in armed conflict. The selection of the literature is based on works that are referenced, that offer a scientific approach, and which review either the phenomenon of hybrid warfare or its countermeasures empirically. Unscientific works have been omitted. The analysis of the literature presented here shows that the antidotes to ‘hybridity’ lie not in the operational or tactical sphere but in strategic and political domains.     

The campaign of the lost footsteps: the pacification of Burma, 1885-95

ABSTRACT

What Rudyard Kipling called the ‘campaign of lost footsteps’ was the longest campaign fought by the Victorian army. The conquest of Upper Burma, an area of 140,000 sq. miles with a population of four million, took only three weeks in November 1885 and was accomplished with minimum cost. However, the removal and deportation of the Burmese King and dismantling of all traditional authority dismantled led to growing resistance to British rule leading to an increasingly difficult guerrilla war. Though the Burmese guerrillas were characterised by the British as mere bandits or dacoits, many were former soldiers along with Buddhist monks. The extremely difficult nature of campaigning in the terrain and climate of Burma was not sufficiently appreciated by the War Office, who viewed the conflict as a ‘subaltern’s war’ and ‘police’ work. Intended regime change was also not accompanied by any consideration of the likely implications. Prolonged insurgency necessitated deploying a force far larger than originally intended; though order was finally secured by 1895, the campaign proved destructive of Burmese society while British recruitment of hill tribes into the police and armed forces sowed the seeds for future divisions.     

The Damoclean sword of offensive cyber: Policy uncertainty and collective insecurity

Cyberspace is a new domain of operation, with its own characteristics. Cyber weapons differ qualitatively from kinetic ones: They generate effects by non-kinetic means through information, technology, and networks. Their properties, opportunities, and constraints are comparable to the qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. New weapons and their target sets in a new domain raise a series of unresolved policy challenges at the domestic, bilateral, and international levels about deterrence, attribution, and response. They also introduce new risks: uncertainty about unintended consequences, expectations of efficacy, and uncertainty about both the target’s and the international community’s response. Cyber operations offer considerable benefits for states to achieve strategic objectives both covertly and overtly. However, without a strategic framework to contain and possibly deter their use, make state and non-state behavior more predictable in the absence of reciprocal norms, and limit their impact, an environment where states face persistent attacks that nonetheless fall below the threshold of armed conflict presents a policy dilemma that reinforces collective insecurity.     

Late Medieval Lance Use: Mounted Combat and Martial Arts in Western Europe from the 14th to the 16th Century

Despite the lance’s status and the amount of attention the couched lance has received in historiography, study of its martial art has been neglected. The various lance types and techniques used by western European cavalry have only recently begun to receive scholarly attention. Additionally, Medieval European lance use has too often been studied in isolation, without an adequate understanding of the idiosyncratic and asymmetrical dynamics of mounted combat. Although the charge with the couched lance was a valid tactic, it was only one of many. Light and heavy lances were used in one hand or two to trip, block, unhorse, and wrestle. These techniques were governed by the harsh laws of distance, speed, impact, iron, and asymmetry. By utilizing the surviving Fechtbücher and several Peninsular and Near Eastern sources, a brief foray into the diverse techniques of lance use and their purposes has been attempted here.     

基于影响图方法的信息战模型

基于信息战内涵,分析了信息因素和兵力因素在信息战过程中相互作用的关系,根据影响图建模理论,建立了信息战模型,得到了兵力与信息耦合作用的微分方程,说明了制信息权在信息战中的决定性作用,为定量研究信息战的兵力和信息要素提供了理论依据。最后通过对模型的分析和简化,导出了我们熟悉的情报战模型和兰彻斯特方程第二线性律,体现了模型的合理性,但是在实际应用时仍需结合具体问题对模型进一步规范和完善,才能得出科学合理而有价值的结论。